Three major themes characterize the development of this class and, in turn, provide some linkages to other aspects of Pakistan's society and economy. Muslim separatism, its probable economic and social antecedents, and its political expression is the first of these themes; its culmination in the creation of a separate state and an increasingly separate economy provided the initial impetus for the creation of a new Pakistani capitalist class. Another crucial aspect of the growth of Pakistan's economy-and of the major firms which emerged-is entrepreneurship of a vigorous, aggressive, and manipulative sort which is often characteristic of the initial phases of a dustrial enterprises, especially in cities which had been characterized by largely nonindustrial economic activities in pre-Partition days, had important consequences in terms of the social, economic-and, eventually, political-modernization of the country. At the same time, the entrepreneurs themselves underwent a process of modernization of values and life-styles. But, in both the broader sense of the modernization of the society and of the entrepreneurial class, the modernization was at best partial. In the present paper, the role of Muslim separatism and partial modernization will be stressed, especially since earlier discussions of the new class have tended to concentrate on questions of entrepreneurship and regional disparities in economic power between East and West Pakistan. 1 
Separatism and Modernization
Since it became obvious, in retrospect, that the opportunities created by the establishment of a separate economy and by the large-scale emigration of Hindus, especially from West Pakistan, were the major factors in the initial establishment of the new Muslim capitalist class, it is tempting to speculate that this was the major root of the separatist effort of the Muslim League. Levin has indeed argued that "the process of capitalist competition pushed the big Muslim bourgeoisie on the path of religio-communal separatism, through the benefits promised to them by the formation of Pakistan."2 But, although big businessmen certainly profited from the establishment of the new state eventually, other factors seem to have been more significant in the establishment and success of the Pakistan movement. The economic arguments for separatism were more broadly based, although a careful historical analysis is needed to establish this aspect of Pakistan's development. Some hypotheses are offered here which are relevant to the development of this approach.
While the creation of Pakistan represented the success of a political movement aimed at setting up a separate state for India's Muslims on the grounds of religious differences and incompatibilities between them and Hindus, it is well known that some of the major supporting arguments used in making the case were based on the economic position of Muslims. In examining this argument, in retrospect, it is essential to distinguish specific groups in the Muslim population in economic terms and to relate their economic status and prospects to the extent of their participation in the separatist movement.
In such an analysis, it is indispensable to examine the nature of the division of labor within the Indian social structure and its relationship to factors of religious differences, on the one hand, and the distinctions between castes (or their non-Hindu equivalents), on the other. Obviously, the lines dividing Hindus and Muslims in socioeconomic terms in undivided India were extremely complex, and it was not possible to distinguish-in overall terms-between Hindus and Muslims along the lines of socioeconomic class differences. While in some regions, such as the Punjab, Muslims were generally cultivators, and many of the landlords and moneylenders were Hindus-a fact which had been recognized by the passage of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 19003--such religious distinctions often did not exist in other areas. Members of both religions were represented in all classes and most occupations in undivided India.
Instead, the economic distinctions between Hindus and Muslims were shaped in more indirect ways through the operation of the caste system.
Within the context of this system, the division of labor between castes generally meant that a given occupation was the specialty of a given caste and that the entrance of outsiders into the occupation tended to be prevented by practices favoring fellow caste members in employment. This type of occupational specialization was common in both Hindu castes and Muslim "quasi-castes" or "communities," at all social levels. Similar occupations have typically been held by Hindu groups in one locality; Muslims, in another; sometimes Muslim and Hindu occupational groups coexist in the same village or larger region. It is probably accurate to say that, for the mass of Hindu and Muslim cultivators, artisans, and urban workers, there was not much difference in undivided India in economic terms in a given occupation between the two religions.
However, in the more modern occupations, particularly those for which a measure of formal education was required, caste and religious factors played a somewhat different role. Traditional claims to such occupations by particular castes were often weaker, and access to them might be open to members of several different groups in the population, depending on opportunities, political factors, the foreclosing of alternatives, and so on. Formal education, provided by the British, proved to be a critical factor in the degree of access to the newer occupations, and it is here that the consequences of the Muslim failure to enter new educational institutions for a generation or more after Hindus did so in the nineteenth century were very marked. The effects were likely to be felt most acutely in the professions, government service, and in the more modern sectors of commerce and industry, all of which required varying degrees of modern education. It was undoubtedly also in these occupations that upward social mobility was likely to be most rapid. In terms of this analysis, then, one would expect that the individuals most highly motivated to join a separatist movement would be Muslims whose access to modern, middle-class occupations was felt to be foreclosed, or advancement made difficult, by the overwhelming dominance of Hindus in these same occupations. The continuing operation of factors which favored the entry of fellow caste members into a given enterprise or occupation probably exacerbated a situation in which Hindus were not only numerically more prevalent but also had the advantage of much earlier entry.
While these hypotheses remain to be more fully substantiated by detailed studies, an approach stressing the social structural characteristics of Indian society and their economic consequences would represent an important new method for analyzing the separatist appeal of the Pakistan movement. As will be shown, such an approach is particularly relevant to the role of private enterprise before and after Partition.
A closely related argument deals with a more general aspect of the dynamics of separatist movements. Such a movement, be it religious, racial, or linguistic, must aim for the mobilization of the entire group which it claims to represent. In the case of the Muslim League, its claim to represent all of India's Muslims tended to foreclose its ability to make more specific class-based appeals and perhaps also to minimize the importance of specific economic and social plans for the new state. The striking absence of well-developed economic plans by the Muslim League leadershipespecially in comparison with Indian National Congress efforts in this respect-was probably one of the factors which later produced such a pronounced bias in favor of private enterprise by the early government of Pakistan (see next section).
Finally, it is also important to remember that no specific statements were made by advocates of separatism about the possible exchange of populations between the two new contemplated states until the very eve of Partition. It is difficult to imagine exactly what kind of vision of the new state of Pakistan was held by the leadership of the separatist movement if one remembers the extent of Hindu control over existing economic institutions in the areas which were to become Pakistan. 4 What patterns of economic and political relationships were expected to develop without significant demographic and institutional changes? Apparently, Jinnah was alone in even broaching the possibility of a planned exchange of populations between India and Pakistan. In January 1947, in an interview with an English journalist, he "expressed his conviction that only a wholesale exchange of minority populations between the future states of India and Pakistan could offer a solution to the ever-growing conflict between the communities."' The idea was categorically opposed by Gandhi as "unthinkable and wrong"; Nehru admitted that such a solution might be possible for the Punjab but would be disastrous to the survival of India if it were to be extended to other areas.6 After Partition had occurred, Liaqat Ali Khan stated (in Lahore on October 10, 1947) that, "although Pakistan would not refuse shelter to any Muslim settler," he strongly opposed supporting the evacuation of Muslims from Indian areas outside the Punjab.7 Thus, while a systematic plan for the exchange of populations seems not to have been part of separatist thinking, the events which did occur make it necessary to question whether the dynamics of separatism, when once set in motion, do not inevitably lead to large-scale population movements. As broadly based studies of refugee movements will perhaps show, such population displacements may occur for reasons of underlying economic and political power, regardless of the intentions of the separatist movement. In any event, the development of Pakistan's society and economy would have been very different if major population shifts had not occurred. The enormous opportunities facing businessmen and industrialists-especially after the Karachi riots of January 1948-were very closely related to the existence of an economic "vacuum," particularly in West Pakistan, as will become clear in the later discussion.
With respect to the role of the new capitalists in the process of " modernization," several distinctions must first be made. In general, the definitions of modernity or modernization which have been developed stress the importance of cities and of factories in various ways. Lerner sees modernity as a "consistent whole," a complex in which are associated such phenomena as "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education [and] media participation."8 Inkeles, in his cross-cultural studies of villagers and factory workers, has focused on an empirical complex of attitudes and values which could be defined as "modern." These attitudes are often strikingly associated with numbers of years of formal schooling but sometimes even more so with numbers of years spent as a worker in a factory.9 Huntington, discussing political development, defines political modernization as "rationalization of authority, differentiation of structure, and expansion of political participation" but stresses the fact that this is only the theoretical rather than the actual direction in which social, economic, and cultural modernization affect the movement away from a traditional polity.10 Bellah, in a discussion of the role of religion and modernization in Asia, notes that "increased effectiveness in goal attainment" must be accompanied by an "increase in the rationalization of the goal-setting process [otherwise] very serious pathologies can result." Such pathologies are the product of "partial or disturbed modernization, not the inevitable result of modernization itself.""1 Some of the common elements which can be taken from these definitions and discussions of various aspects of modernization-and which have been variously elaborated in the larger literature in this field-apply to the role of the new capitalists in several different ways. First of all, it is clear that the development of new economic institutions by a relatively small group of owners and managers has social and political implications going far beyond the economic consequences. In Pakistan, the growth of manufacturing industries in large urban centers resulted in the creation of a new class of urban industrial workers, generally drawn from rural landless laborers, urban casual workers, and others. Despite the fact that industrial wage rates rose only very little in the decades following Partition,12 while industrial profits rose tremendously, especially at the beginning,13 the creation of this new urban class differentiated them from rural and urban casual laborers in economic terms, with probable long-range political consequences. The creation of an urban proletariat was clearly one of the early effects of economic "modernization"; the failure of the government to assure more equitable income distribution indicated one of the failures of the modernization process, resulting from increased political power by the industrial owners. Furthermore, new consumer goods began to be locally manufactured and to be more widely visible than ever before, while at the same time large masses of the population continued to be unable to buy such goods. Finally, the development of the new economic institutions provided many opportunities for great profit and very rapid social mobility by relatively few families and resulted in the development of a new group of businessmen and industrialists with higher status than most of them had ever had before. In terms of class formation, there is no doubt that the new state rapidly developed newly demarcated social groups in its structure, which included a group of nouveaux riches as part of the upper class, and a segment of the middle class engaged in business and manufacturing occupations in various capacities ranging from self-employed entrepreneurs to managers and clerks. In addition, the industrial labor force, which occupied a position above that of the urban unemployed and casual workers and well above that of rural landless laborers, began to develop increasingly, especially in the larger cities where industries were concentrated.
The term "partial modernization" is also peculiarly applicable to the new rich themselves as well as to their efforts to adjust and assimilate to "the existing order [ and a rather simple middle-class life-style which emphasized conspicuous consumption only in highly visible public occasions associated with family status, such as weddings. With respect to education, the prevalent attitudes of members of "business communities" tended to be highly instrumental, that is, a minimum level of formal education was customary before an intensive period of business apprenticeship. Some of the changes which this group underwent following their economic success will be indicated in the more detailed discussion of twelve Big Houses later in this paper, in an attempt to give some support to the notion of "partial modernization" in one respect.
The view of "partial modernization" as "pathology" needs, however, to hand, the Muslim League, which was trying to develop a position of exclusively representing all Muslims, may have found it difficult to make specific pronouncements which might have emphasized class differences among Muslims. Sayeed notes that "after 1945, there seems to be an attempt on the part of Jinnah to be all things to all people. It was true that he wanted Muslim capitalists to establish Muslim enterprises, but at the same time he was expressing grave concern about the gross inequalities that existed."19 At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that a political movement in whose Council the two largest groups were landlords (163 out of 503) and lawyers (145)20 would take a particularly radical stance on economic issues. Efforts in provincial Leagues to introduce resolutions calling for the nationalization of public utilities, public control of private industry, and a tax policy directed to a sharp equalization of incomes were not made part of the general policies of the Muslim League at the national level.21
In the immediate circle around Jinnah, several big businessmen and industrialists played important roles, not only in helping to finance the Pakistan movement, but also in helping to organize businessmen, and in more specifically political roles. These men were also active in setting up private firms which were to fulfill important economic roles in the new state, as will be discussed in some detail.
Muslims in commercial occupations also clearly felt that it was high time for Muslims to occupy more-and more important-positions in the economy, and these feelings were obviously shared by at least some of the political leaders. When Pakistani businessmen spoke of the early postPartition years, they almost unanimously stressed their eagerness at that time to prove that Muslims like themselves could be successful businessmen and industrialists. In terms strikingly reminiscent of resentment against colonial rulers, many of them described how Hindu contempt of Muslim business skills had rankled, and how they had been angered by statements that Muslims "obviously" were not capable in business and finance or industrial management. This feeling was probably part of the general Muslim wish for greater access to jobs and for greater prestige in modern occupations in all sectors of the economy, which would be easier if Muslims were employers.
In any event, Jinnah made his government's position explicit soon after and merchants will always be welcome and that they, in building up their own fortunes, will not forget their social responsibility for a fair and square deal to one and all, big and small.22
It is not surprising, then, when businessmen recall that there was "not th slightest doubt in my mind that Jinnah and the Muslim League were favor of private enterprise; there was no question at the time of any othe system.''23 These facts should dispel any tendencies to see the early post-Partition period, when Jinnah was still alive, as one in which private enterprise wa being kept at bay. In 1970, Wahidul Haque wrote that "the leader of t revolution, Quaid-e-Azam, himself coming from a merchant family, unified all segments of the Muslim society in order to create a homeland for them free from feudal-capitalist-ecclesiastical oppression . . . . After t death of the Quaid-e-Azam on September 11, 1948, the process of capitalis tic development of the new state was launched under the hegemony of th bourgeois elite."24 Whatever else might be said about the achievements of Jinnah and the Pakistan movement, it does seem to be evident that th actual alignment between at least some big businessmen and the Musli League leadership had begun long before Independence.
When Partition came with its attendant horrors and violent popula tion displacements, events further reinforced an initial government i clination toward private enterprise because the economy was in chaos, and the very small number of available government officials were needed for tasks other than the management of state enterprises. The result of the am bivalent position of the Muslim League leadership on the question o economic organization and power was that there existed no ideologica commitment to any economic policies which might have counteracted, how ever faintly, the general disposition to continue the system as it stood.
The most clear-cut evidence of Jinnah's relationship with businessmen before Partition is provided by the role which he personally played in the mobilization of Muslim businessmen through the organization of Musli chambers of commerce and through the establishment of "nation-building What is perhaps more interesting is that these firms remain politically highly visible and their names remain powerful symbols, even though, by the late 1960s, some of them were far outdistanced in economic terms by other big enterprise groups. While association with the Pakistan movement was an important factor in the initial rise of these firms, it is probable that wealth, business experience, and aggressive entrepreneurship were far more crucial. In the initial establishment of Pakistan's industrial giants, politics of the visible sort were not the key factor, as may become clearer in the discussion of the twelve largest Big Houses in a later section of this paper. mobilized Muslim sentiment through the creation of groups or institutions which were not particularly new in type, except that they were specifically by and for Muslims.
The "Nation-building" Companies Another type of mobilization of Muslim sentiment and resources in the immediate pre-Partition period was the formation of new companies by a few Muslim big businessmen, mainly at Jinnah's urging. The fact that these companies were organized before Partition to meet some of the economic needs of the new state must have indicated to Muslim businessmen that the government of Pakistan might be expected to be favorable to private enterprise. Also, it is possible that they, in turn, influenced the leadership of the Pakistan movement in the course of the organization of the companies, at least in the sense of raising some issues of interest to them.
Four companies were organized in the period immediately before Partition; all were privately financed, owned, and managed by largely Muslim capitalists. Most of the investors in the four firms were either personally close to Jinnah or had gradually moved into positions of support for the establishment of a Muslim state, whether or not they themselves intended to migrate there. They came from families which were among the wealthiest Muslims in commerce and industry in undivided India: Adamjee, Ispahani, Rahimtoola, Dada (and other Bantva Memons), Habib (of the Habib Bank) and several others. Eventually, all these families did migrate to Pakistan, and most of them are among the leading business-industrial families today -but it is important to remember that many of them had not initially intended to do so.32 Until riots in their hometowns forced them to migrate (as was the case for the Bantva Memons), many of these families had planned to carry out their business activities in both of the new independent states, while remaining in their original places of residence. Their decision to invest in the new companies was based both on the expectation of good profits and the political significance of the move. The actual investments, however, represented only very small fractions of these families' total assets. It is also important to note, finally, that only one of the major investors in the four companies was a resident of the area which was to become Pakistan-Rustom Cowasjee, a Karachi Parsi shipping magnate.
A very important forerunner of the four companies was the Habib Bank, which, in its turn, played a crucial role in the establishment of the later firms. prove extremely interesting. There is certainly no question that these businessmen understood the potential which might be offered by an independent Pakistan in terms of economic opportunities, but it would be a gross oversimplification to see this as the major causative factor in the separatist movement. Other forces of social and economic discontent were probably much more significant than simply a drive for capitalist expansion of markets-which of course played a role-and these forces need to be studied by social and economic historians.
In most of these efforts, only a small group of families was involved, most of whom were of western Indian origin. The Ispahani brothers, whose family came to Bombay from Iran in 1820, later shifting to Calcutta, were perhaps an exception. But, in this group, wealthy Punjabi business families were very few, the major exceptions being Nasir A. Sheikh of Colony, and All of these factors placed a premium on entry into business, first in commodity imports and later in the manufacture of basic consumer goods, particularly textiles. Because of the virtual interruption of trade ties with India, commodity importing was crucial in the immediate post-Partition years. In the early 1950s, the boom produced by the Korean War increased both the availability of foreign exchange and the demand for imports, rendering the import business extremely profitable. When this boom ended, the government's action in restricting further imports, particularly in textiles, caused many businessmen to shift rapidly into textile manufacturing. For economic reasons, and because it was possible to import foreign technology along with technicians, the manufacturing plants which were established in this early period were almost all quite large in size and extremely profitable. The pattern of opportunities, in which both accident and improvisation played an important role, was such that considerable assets could be accumulated in the immediate post-Partition period in commercial activities. Consequently, both established business families with large assets from pre-Independence times and comparative newcomers to big business were subsequently able to make the initial investments in large-scale industrial enterprises which generally formed the basis for the Big Houses. who had experience in commerce, access to an existing network of commercial intelligence and credit, as well as fairly substantial assets; all of these plus even more substantial assets were required to make the subsequent entry into manufacturing industry.
An additional set of factors derived from the South Asian social structure accounts for the particularly important role played in Pakistan's economic growth by members of "business communities."42 Obviously, the existing economic opportunities placed a premium on the availability of large amounts of capital, business skills, and knowledge of suppliers, markets, and so on. While some of these factors might have been available to educated persons from other occupational backgrounds, such people lacked the incentives in the early years to enter business occupations, since they were often well established in existing positions. Refugees displaced from other middle-class occupations did try to enter business, but these enterprises were generally at a lower level, requiring little capital.
But over and above the possession of individual skills and assets, members of business communities were affected by a set of additional factors which proved to be crucial.
Within the South Asian social structure, the occupational specialization of entire ascriptive groups, such as castes or their non-Hindu counterparts ("communities"), has meant, in the case of commercial communities, that a range of socioeconomic classes exist within the community and that a wide variety of commercial jobs, ranging from street hawker to company president, is held by members of the group. There may well be some specialization by a given community in a single group of products, such as grains or textiles, but there is a considerable amount of social mobility within the confines of the community. Group loyalties play an extremely important role in hiring and employment in commercial enterprises (though not in the case of factory labor). Potential entrepreneurs can come from various class levels within the community, which retains its strong emphasis on self-employment in business as the most desirable occupation, thus assuring a continuing supply of both manpower and entrepreneurial replacements. Within the business communities, there is also a wellfunctioning information network, producing not only intense rivalries among competitors, but also diffusion of information and a system for assessing credit worthiness, and much better access to credit facilities than would be available to unaffiliated individuals. Rivalry, information, and access to capital produced a tendency toward more innovative entrepreneurial behavior, especially in a situation with as many opportunities for business profit as existed in the early years of the new state.
At the same time, people in business occupations as a group held relatively low status with respect to the educated elites, even though wealth itself plays an important role in the status evaluation of individuals and families. Persons from other middle-class occupations, or wealthy landlords with available capital, were not highly motivated to shift to business in the early period. The relative lack of formal education of the first generation of entrepreneurs contributed further to this evaluation of the status of businessmen, and this was particularly true of the newcomers, especially the most enterprising ones.
These were some of the reasons why the entrants into modern industry in the first decade of Pakistan's existence were primarily men from business backgrounds who belonged to business communities. This pattern has been well documented by studies of Pakistan's industrial sector, such as G. F.
Papanek's 1959-60 survey of industry and the survey of businessmen and industrialists on which this paper is based. The regional distribution of occupationally specialized Muslim business communities-whose historical origins are still not well understood-accounted also for the fact that entrants into industry were largely persons who had worked outside Pakistan areas before Partition, including many of western Indian origin. In this respect, one of the factors accounting for the domination of East Pakistan's commerce and industry by non-Bengali Muslims has been the relative absence of occupationally specialized Muslim Bengali business communities. Other significant factors for this disparity were, of course, political-such as the location of the capital at Karachi and the nature of economic policies.
The Twelve Biggest "Big Houses"
These factors in the development of the new class are shown particularly clearly in the business histories of the largest company groups. Among the largest of the Big Houses, it is obvious that early entry-in the first five years-into industry after Partition was a crucial factor in their rise to the top. By the same token, the largest company groups cannot be taken as typical of the development of an industrial class in Pakistan; in later years, other entrepreneurs moved into industrial activities from backgrounds in occupations other than those of the pioneering entrepreneurs. But, because of the great importance of the large companies in the economy-and in social and political matters as well-it is instructive to look at some of them more closely. The leading families which make up this top group have considerable political significance, both as symbols and as actors, but fully accurate facts are not available in detail, despite frequent public references to them. Systematic data, presumably available to government sources, will be needed to present a complete picture of the economic role of these families; the public records, such as annual company reports of public companies, show only a part. Here, a comparison has been made of two lists; one, a privately compiled ranking made by highly knowledgeable businessmen, based on esti- In terms of net worth, the first eight Houses were estimated in late 1968 to be above ten crores rupees ($20 million at the official rate); of these, the two or three leading Houses were thought to be worth almost twenty crores. Of course, in comparison with large U.S. companies, these amounts are quite small, but in the Pakistani context and in view of the estimated starting assets of some of these companies, they are quite startling.
If the list is expanded to twenty or twenty-five, it includes, in terms of net worth, many of the very large commercial Houses which were also active in undivided India, particularly Dada, Adam, and Arag (all Bantva Memons), as well as some of the newer Punjabi Houses based on cotton exports and industry, and a number of Parsis in industry, trade, and real estate. The Ispahani family (so prominent in pre-Partition Muslim League politics) is included toward the bottom of the list of twenty-five and fairly well down the list ranked in terms of paid-up capital of public companies.
Most of the twelve industrial-commercial combines on the above list are relative newcomers to large-scale industrial activity, even though the scope of commercial activity in which some of them engaged-as did some not on the present list of twelve-was very large in the Indian context.
It is quite clear that in undivided India there were few Muslim industrialists who had large enterprises; in the group of twelve considered here, only Adamjee in Calcutta was a large-scale industrialist. In addition, Bawany held several industrial enterprises in Rangoon. Some of the others (Saigol, Colony) had begun relatively small industrial enterprises. At the same time, several families in this group of twelve were very wealthy, mainly as a result of successful commercial ventures, including government contracting and especially army-supply contracting.
In the case of all twelve families, business activity was not a new occupation but generally went back several generations. None of the present heads of firms are new entrants to business, although all of them have undergone considerable shifts within their basic occupation in the sense of moving from commercial to manufacturing operations and in vastly increasing the size of their enterprises. At the same time, only very few in this group belong to families who had so consolidated their commercial success in a preceding generation that they had been able to establish themselves in a fairly high status position. In very broad terms, high status in the generation preceding the major entrepreneurs of these twelve families had been achieved only by Adamjee and Wazirali, and to a lesser extent by Amin, Colony, Bawany, and Habib. Among the others, the most dramatic status change-from newcomer to magnate-was probably achieved by Dawood, Valika, and Fancy. The rest constitute a kind of middle group, where changes in wealth, economic power, and status were only slightly less dramatic than in the case of the most pronounced new-
comers.
An interesting indication of these status changes i educational achievements of entrepreneurs. Among b trialists as a whole, there has been a dramatic chang achievement between generations: the sons of the major large firms generally have achieved between five and ten education than their fathers. In a group of eighty-six various sizes, all holding import licenses, surveyed in 37 percent of heads of firms claimed they had at least t schooling, while only 6 percent of their fathers had
In a group of twenty-five very large firms surveyed, sligh current heads of firms said they had between zero and te while nearly 90 percent of their fathers were in this cat sons of heads of firms were old enough to make stat possible, but the data support a very large further shift Within the group of twelve Big Houses discussed development has resulted in sharp differences within Generally, in those families where wealth and high achieved in an earlier generation, the major entrepren firms were educated at least to the level of matriculates o of school or more), while the more newly mobile fam formal education less than immediate entrance into business at the time when the major entrepreneurs of the present firms were growing up. Only five of the major entrepreneurs (i.e., men primarily responsible for the establishment and growth of the firm after Partition) in this group of twelve were educated to matriculation or better, including one B.A. and two B.Sc.'s. The remaining seven entrepreneurs were educated to levels below matriculation, including instances where formal education was very rudimentary indeed. Among some of these seven-and this includes major entrepreneurs who have since died or been replaced by a younger generation-knowledge of English was very scant at the time of Partition, although it was improved as the enterprises grew, sometimes by formal lessons.
In addition to their significance in terms of status, educational achievements are also important in another sense. The Pakistan experience makes it quite clear that entrepreneurial success, in the circumstances which existed, was much less dependent upon formal education than on other skills and assets. If formal education in the institutions provided by the British colonial administration could be said to have played a role in changing the values as well as skills of South Asian students, then it is likely that these particular values were not very important in the business context or in entrepreneurial activities. In fact, the biographies of businessmen collected in this study as a whole indicate that a basic level of educational achievement was important-that is, literacy, some arithmetic, and perhaps enough English to send and receive telegrams-but that very high levels of education-that is, beyond matriculation-were in some sense dysfunctional for business success.46 This was also indicated in G. F.
Papanek's survey of industrialists: men with low educational achievements were about as likely as men with high educational achievements to be successful entrepreneurs, if not somewhat more so.47
Another dimension, religion and community, is also illustrated in this group of twelve Big Houses. All of these families are Muslims. While the top ranks of big business include several Parsi families (three out of the top twenty in terms of estimated net assets), only one of these three is primarily involved in large industry (Hirjina), while the others are in shipping, trade, urban real estate, and some industry (Cowasjee, E. M. An additional dimension of religious differences is closely related to occupational specialization of quasi-caste groups and to minority status. With only two exceptions (Hyesons, Wazirali) , all the families in the top group of twelve belong to quasi-caste groups with a traditional occupational specialization in commerce, known as business communities. The Punjabis in this group often refer to themselves as "Chiniotis," or at least as related to the Sheikhs specialized in business who are particularly concentrated in the West Punjabi town of Chiniot. In both group structure and historical development, the Sheikhs of the western Punjab are quite different from the business communities of western India, particularly those centered in Kathiawar, Gujarat, and Bombay City.
The most important Muslim business community of Kathiawar origin is the Memons; from the Bombay area come the Khoja Ismailis, the Khoja Isnasheris, and the Dawoodi Bohras. These four communities areat least in Pakistan-cohesive, fairly structured groups, with some degree of internal organization, including some panchayat-like councils and some voluntary organizations. Each group is endogamous. In addition, there are some religious factors: the three groups from the Bombay area all belong to different sects of Shias, for whom religious observances and internal religious organizations are significant bonds of solidarity and marks of distinctiveness from other groups.
Overall, the distribution among the business families of various religious allegiances within Islam is as follows: Memons and Punjabi Sheikhs are Sunnis, while Khoja Ismailis, Khoja Isnasheris, and Dawoodi Bohras are Shias. Syed families are also Shia. Since the majority of Pakistanis are Sunnis, and since the most significant business communities-in terms of numbers and economic activities-are also Sunni, it is difficult to see the role of business communities as illustrative of a minority-group hypothesis in the usual sense. However, there is no doubt that the strong commitment to a business occupation, which is very prevalent among Memons, and to slightly lesser degrees in the other groups, does constitute a self-defining characteristic for members of these communities which differentiates them from others.
It is only in this very special sense of self-definition that the business communities might be considered "minorities" within the population.
Although a wider discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, the role of Pakistani business communities does raise some questions about the generally accepted role of "minority groups" as entrepreneurs. In this view, a causal connection is sometimes assumed between a group's minority status within the population, as defined in some generally accepted religious or racial terms (Jews, Chinese, Lebanese, etc., in various settings), and their entrepreneurial activities and successes. In the case of India and Pakistan, at least, the existence of occupationally specialized castes and communities raises the possibility of many other causal factors which may be more important.
Some reference has already been made to the fact that many Muslim businessmen and industrialists, whether originally from Pakistan areas or not, typically worked in non-Pakistan areas before Partition. The differences between resident Muslims and refugee Muslims, which are crucial in the political sense,50 need to be modified in the case of the business families to include also the category of "returnees." The special significance of this category lies in the fact that, even if these families were engaged in business or manufacturing in places distant from their hometowns, the men often left their wives and children behind in the hometowns and also maintained a network of personal and commercial connections in their province of origin. This network often proved to be immensely important, either as part of the commercial enterprise carried on in distant places or as part of a new enterprise begun after Partition. Pre-1947 groups is only somewhat less remarkable. In terms of the present head quarters of firms, at least in the late 1960s, all of the above firms (with the possible exception of Adamjee) were located in West Pakistan, although many had substantial enterprises in East Pakistan.
In terms of starting resources available at the time of Partition, there are substantial differences between the twelve firms, even given the very unsatisfactory nature of information on this point. Some of the firm which can be described as newcomers to big business are generally con sidered to have begun their enterprises with available assets considerably below one crore rupees ($2 million), and some estimates indicate that they have multiplied their net worth in twenty years by factors ranging from twenty-to sixty-fold. Outstanding in these terms, that is, modest beginning and large growth, are Dawood, Crescent, Fancy, Valika, and Colony. Such dramatic rates of increase in economic assets do not apply to the same extent to many other business families who entered Pakistan with substantial assets and who have remained among the Big Houses withou comparable increases in their holdings. This latter group includes many of the families who were most closely connected with the Pakistan movement, while the owners of some of the most rapidly growing firms were not.
In making the point that the top group of entrepreneurs (either the top twelve or top twenty or thirty) were not part of an already-existing elite but represented a newly risen group, three of the characteristics which have been mentioned are particularly relevant: prior wealth, prior political prominence, and educational attainments. On a combination of these three criteria, only very few families in this group could be considered to qualify or to have been even marginally accepted into existing elite groups. In terms of their life-styles, and despite the considerable wealth of many families, most of these business families were essentially middleclass. It was not until the 1960s that conspicuous luxury spending by this group became obvious and widespread, even in terms of urban middleclass standards.
In the business histories of the larger sample of Pakistani businessmen as well as in the case of the group examined here, it also becomes quite clear that political or civic activity becomes important to a business family only when some manpower can be spared from the business. This is typically a task of the second generation or occurs quite late in the life of an entrepreneur after the firm has been well established. Civic activity within the "community" is likely to begin somewhat earlier and is considered to be a definite obligation to be met by prominent or wealthy persons. It is expected that their wealth and prestige should be used on behalf of the community to at least some extent. The most dramatic illustration of such a combination of activities and the use of leadership prestige to advance economic goals is provided by the Khoja Ismailis.
One of the major functions of the well-known Jubilee "weighings" of the Aga Khan has been the collection of funds from his followers as a religious obligation. In the last such weighing, conducted in Pakistan in the early 1950s, these funds were collected in terms of shares in a finance corporation (Platinum Jubilee Finance Corporation), and capital was subsequently lent out to members of the community through credit cooperatives and other community institutions.51 A more common pattern is for prominent businessmen to be elected presidents of various community institutions in order to represent the community in the outside world, give personal donations, lend prestige to arbitration between contending parties, and provide business acumen and personal connections for the solution of financial problems. Such positions in the community may lead to wider recognition in business organizations or civic activities, but business leaders have generally been conspicuously absent from the world of politics as representative figures, except in a few rare instances. Of course, they have been reported to have played important roles in the financing of various political parties of both the Right and the Left, but these activities have generally not been well publicized. Nevertheless, prominent business- These men were mainly newcomers to the ranks of big business, but they included a few extremely skillful and aggressive entrepreneurs who established themselves very rapidly in the front ranks of the new elite.
With a few exceptions, these newcomers established new industrial enterprises more rapidly than the commercial Houses who had earlier been among the leading Muslim business groups. Among these relative newcomers, there are large numbers of Punjabi entrepreneurs-many of whom had been in business outside Pakistan before returning-who entered large-scale industry and became extremely powerful in the economy. In the list of twelve Big Houses, which emphasizes industrial interests more than commercial ones, the large majority consists of families with no prior connection with the Pakistan movement; a somewhat smaller proportion consists of families with relatively little prior wealth, although all had been in business before.
Obviously, the large commercial Houses are also still at the top of the business-industrial class, just below these top twelve, as an expansion of the list of Big Houses would show, although this has not been done in the present paper. This indicates the importance of large assets, business skills, and business connections in the establishment of large enterprises but also shows that the earlier political connections of the immigrant Muslim business families were less important than some other factors in the achievement of large-scale industrial control. At the same time, it is important to recall that many newcomers lacked all of these advantages and yet established enterprises which were the foundation of later Big Houses or somewhat smaller but still significant firms.
Another major feature of the business-industrial elite is the predominance of members of occupationally specialized business communities among the leading families. This is as true for the list of twelve analyzed here, as it is for a longer list of twenty-five or-thirty; it is further supported by broader studies of all industrialists (as of 1960) and of segments of the business-industrial group (as of 1967-68). The significance of this businesscommunity background extends over several areas of social and economic activity. On the one hand, members of business communities have had extensive training in business skills and established connections with a network of information and credit facilities within the community itself.
In addition, membership in a business community serves to identify a person in terms of a significant network when his credit worthiness is evaluated by outside agencies or when he seeks employment. Rivalry between members of the same business community is also an important feature of the entrepreneurship shown by these people, as is the tendency for businessmen to imitate the business decisions of others whom they know, envy, and respect. Preference in hiring members of one's own community further strengthens community bonds and also serves to insure a continuing commitment to business occupations by younger, lowerstatus members of the community who may later move up into entrepreneurial positions not pre-empted by the sons of wealthier families.
These factors of a continuing supply of manpower for business occupations and their relationship to the business community's typical tendency to include a range of socioeconomic classes are extremely significant aspects of the operation of these traditional social groupings in a modern economy.
Additional features of the business communities include the prevailing traditional custom of arranged marriages within the group, which often affects the ownership and inheritance of assets, and a frequently highly conservative tendency with regard to the status of women and the role of The relative lack of formal education by businessmen as a whole and big businessmen in particular has also been a serious problem in the achievement of status. Educated elite groups in Pakistan have tended to look down on businessmen and to assume a high level of corruption, inefficiency, and greed. Although this expectation was frequently confirmed, it also affected the particular pattern of relationships which developed among big businessmen, government officials, and politicians.
A general feeling of working together to make Pakistan a reality, which often characterized government officials in the early years, existed between government and business to a much smaller extent. Educational achievement was one of the symbols used in maintaining some degree of social distance between businessmen, as a group, and members of the existing establishment.
Status, education, wealth, and political connections affect the role of big businessmen in the modernization process, particularly with respect to establishing connections with newer political forces emerging in the country. The small group of leading businessmen-industrialists who have developed Pakistan's industrial establishments in the private sector have, of course, played an important role in the modernization of the country simply by developing industry. At the same time, there is no doubt that the concentration of economic control in the hands of a very small number of families has had very serious effects on the distributive aspects of growth. Both the overt and hidden participation of businessmen in various aspects of the administrative and decision-making process and in the activities of political parties has been in the interests of maintaining their pattern of control relatively unimpaired. Future relationships with new political elites will clearly be affected, not only by the existing power relationships between business and government, but also by a pattern of attitudes regarding the role of businessmen and their presumed status attributes which are held by other elite groups. Of particular importance in this respect is the role of entrepreneurship and educated management, since it is clear that the establishment of the large family combines was based on a particularly aggressive entrepreneurial style; which is now associated with business activities in general. One major question which will deserve careful consideration from several angles will be the future role of educated managers in executive positions in business firms and the relationship of these managers to interest groups and political parties.
A particularly salient feature of the role of the Big Houses is the absence of indigenous Bengali entrepreneurs, not only from among the top twelve, but essentially from the first thirty. This has been partly based on the historical development of Muslim society in Bengal and the absence of occupationally specialized business communities corresponding in structure and function to those from western India. However, the greater political power held by groups based in West Pakistan has played a crucial role in this process, particularly in the allocation of resources. The location of the capital in West Pakistan has also been of considerable importance in determining the location of businesses and industrial plants. The effect of the economic dominance exercised by big firms based in West Pakistan has been severely felt in East Pakistan, not only in terms of investment decisions, but also in retarding the development of an East Pakistani business and industrial middle class. In many respects, the feelings of Bengali Muslims vis-a-vis West Pakistani Muslims parallel those which were held earlier by Indian Muslims vis-a-vis Hindus-that their entry into the economy and into positions of political and administrative participation was retarded by other groups who had the benefit of earlier entry, greater starting assets, and more effective political support. In this context, it is very relevant to note that East Pakistani industrialists are reported to be among the important supporters of the Awami League leadership.
Despite the earlier lack of close relationships between the businessindustrial elite and decision makers in government, except on an individual level, there is now a much closer tie between these groups, based on shared interests. To a very limited extent, this is indicated by an increase in intermarriage between important business and civil-service families and an increase in the number of young men from other elite backgrounds entering business occupations as trained executives. Although few big businessmen are running for political office in Pakistan, their role in the changing political situation is likely to become increasingly critical. The relationship between the leading families discussed here and the other entrepreneurial groups who have made later and small-scale entry into both manufacturing and commerce is also likely to change. In any event, the complex pattern of social, economic, and political antecedents and consequences in the growth of Pakistan's existing business-industrial elite needs to be understood to evaluate the role of this type of group in a developing, postcolonial society, in whose history separatism has played a crucial role.
